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ARTICLE
THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARDON POWER:
A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY, 1989–2015
JEFFREY CROUCH*
INTRODUCTION
In 1989, political scientist Mark Rozell published a brief essay in the
Journal of Law & Politics that focused on the president’s pardon power. In
the piece, Rozell effectively summarized the legal literature on federal ex-
ecutive clemency. The article has provided researchers with a number of
individual source ideas, as well as a better overall sense of the clemency-
specific topics that have been examined by legal scholars.
Since Rozell’s bibliographic piece, federal executive clemency has re-
ceived a fair amount of attention from legal scholars. In the last quarter
century alone, it has been the primary focus of several special journal issues
and academic symposia, and dozens of law review articles, comments, and
notes. In 2012, political scientist P.S. Ruckman, Jr. published in this jour-
nal1 a comprehensive analysis of what political scientists have written about
clemency. Though valuable, detailed, and sorely needed, this new literature
review did not include within its scope an update to the list of legal cases,
law review articles, notes, and similar materials compiled by Rozell.
Plan for the Article
The purpose of this article is to review significant portions of the legal
literature on clemency published between 1989 and 2015. In the pages that
follow, I focus primarily on conferences/symposia/special issues within this
time period that deal mostly with federal (and not state) executive clemency
and its operation—including its scope, application, and limits. I also con-
sider several law journal publications that cover these topics, but that are
not necessarily part of a larger, clemency-focused event. It is difficult for
* Jeffrey Crouch is an Assistant Professor of American politics at American University. He
is the Reviews and Book Editor for Congress & the Presidency Journal, and his first book, The
Presidential Pardon Power, was published by the University Press of Kansas. His research fo-
cuses primarily on the Constitution, the presidency, and the separation of powers.
1. P.S. Ruckman Jr., The Study of Mercy: What Political Scientists Know (and Don’t Know)
About the Pardon Power, 9 U. OF ST. THOMAS L.J. 783 (2012).
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me to exclude any legal sources from this article, since just about all of
them have been at least somewhat useful in my research. However, because
of space constraints, I will focus my attention here mostly on the authors
that covered an area of the clemency power mentioned above, or otherwise
made a notable contribution. I generally omit or limit discussion of pieces
that are primarily theoretical or philosophical, or that refer to clemency only
in the context of a larger subject (death penalty cases, for instance).
Preview of Topics Discussed in this Article
I begin with a brief examination of the Nixon pardon from 1974,
mostly because several of the pieces discussed below refer back to this
well-known clemency decision. From there, I jump ahead to the 1990s and
begin my examination of legal works on clemency published after Rozell’s
earlier bibliographic piece went to press.
The 1990s featured the Iran-Contra pardons by George H. W. Bush,
and clemency scholars published work examining a number of issues re-
lated to the appropriate use of the clemency power. Here, I briefly review a
number of these pieces, particularly those focused on (1) the Iran-Contra
scandal itself; (2) a pardon granted in the context of an investigation; (3)
whether it is possible for a president to “self-pardon”; (4) how clemency
should be administered; (5) whether a deceased person might be eligible for
presidential clemency; and (6) the effect of a pardon.
In the decade of the 2000s, President Bill Clinton granted clemency to
a number of controversial figures, including members of the FALN (Fu-
erzas Armadas de Liberacio´n Nacional) and Marc Rich. Thereafter, a num-
ber of scholars and informed observers weighed in on Clinton’s clemency
decisions in a number of legal publications. First, I discuss several contribu-
tions to a special double issue of Federal Sentencing Reporter.  I review
those contributions on the following topics: (1) international clemency; (2)
“systematic” pardons; (3) pardon as a prerogative power; (4) whether the
president should provide reasons to justify clemency grants; (5) clemency’s
role within the context of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984; (6) inappro-
priate pardons granted for personal reasons; (7) legal practitioners’ perspec-
tives on Clinton’s clemency actions; (8) who should review clemency
applications; and (9) a number of helpful related documents related to these
topics reproduced in the appendix to the double issue of Federal Sentencing
Reporter. Second, I go through scholarly contributions to an issue of Capi-
tal University Law Review. In this article, I look at pieces published there
on the following subjects: (1) ways to limit the clemency power; (2) the
mass media and coverage of clemency; and (3) the bureaucracy that
processes clemency applications.
George W. Bush followed Bill Clinton’s uneven clemency legacy with
one of his own, thanks largely to a decision to commute the prison sentence
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of one of his administration’s top-ranking staffers, I. Lewis “Scooter”
Libby. This particularly volatile clemency decision was the main focus of a
2007 issue of Federal Sentencing Reporter, and led to a fresh examination
of clemency-related topics. Articles from that issue examined here consid-
ered the following: (1) ways that clemency could be restored to its former
place of respectability in the American justice system; (2) how the commu-
tation application process might be revamped; and (3) documents relevant
to the Libby situation.
Other issues addressed in law review pieces during this decade (and
considered here) included: (1) whether we should amend the Constitution in
order to avoid future presidential abuse of clemency; (2) whether it would
make sense to implement other reforms designed to improve clemency; (3)
if Congress does (or should) weigh in on clemency matters; (4) how “condi-
tional” clemency works; and (5) a number of “nuts and bolts” regarding the
operation of the clemency bureaucracy and the reasoning driving clemency
decisions.
So far, the 2010s have not featured a clemency scandal reaching the
magnitude of those in the 1990s and 2000s. Still, a variety of legal venues
have featured important clemency scholarship. I begin my examination of
legal clemency work from the decade of the 2010s with a 2012 issue of the
University of St. Thomas Law Journal. I consider pieces from this issue on
the following topics: (1) whether the president’s commutation power re-
mains relevant; (2) if courts have a role to play in clemency cases; and (3)
whether states might be able to contribute ideas for reform of the federal
clemency system. Scholars published pieces elsewhere during this decade
on the following topics, all of which I examine in this article: (1) whether
drug offenders should receive clemency; (2) a look back at the final Clinton
“pardoning party”; (3) whether clemency is in its “twilight”; and, finally,
(4) how to fix the clemency screening bureaucracy.
I conclude the article with a detailed References section that updates
Rozell’s master list of legal sources using his original categories, with one
addition: websites.
I. GERALD FORD AND THE NIXON PARDON
President Gerald Ford stunned the world on September 8, 1974, with
his announcement that he had decided to pardon his disgraced predecessor,
Richard Nixon, for any crimes that Nixon may have committed while serv-
ing as President of the United States.2 Legal scholars have rarely closely
examined the Nixon pardon despite its status as probably the most famous
2. For a detailed account of this decision, see JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON
POWER 66–85 (2009).
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clemency decision of the past 40 years.3 The few pre-1989 pieces concen-
trating solely on the Nixon pardon are outside the scope of this article, but
there are a couple of more recent works that a clemency researcher should
consider tracking down.4
One of the most fascinating pieces about the Nixon pardon is a first-
person recollection by Benton Becker, the lawyer charged by President Ger-
ald Ford to speak with Richard Nixon in person about a possible pardon.5 In
this piece, Becker discusses his own impressions of the historic arrange-
ment between Nixon and Ford that both secured a pardon for Nixon that
covered any crimes he may have committed while president of the United
States and also preserved the former chief executive’s presidential records.
II. THE 1990S: GEORGE H.W. BUSH AND THE IRAN-CONTRA PARDONS
In his bibliographic essay, Rozell noted the possibility that President
Ronald Reagan may offer clemency to John Poindexter and Oliver North,
two administration officials that were in the news at the time because of the
Iran-Contra scandal. President Reagan never pardoned Poindexter or
North,6 but his vice president and successor in office, George H.W. Bush,
pardoned Caspar Weinberger and five others involved in the scandal in
1992.7
Several authors seized upon the issues raised by the Iran-Contra par-
dons as an entry point into a discussion of the president’s pardon power.
Among the issues analyzed8 were: (1) the impact a pardon might have on an
investigation; (2) whether a president could use clemency to excuse him-
self; (3) whether the clemency process should be more transparent to the
public; (4) if the president may grant clemency to someone who is de-
ceased; and (5) how completely a pardon can impact a criminal conviction.
3. See Mark J. Rozell, The Presidential Pardon Power: A Bibliographic Essay, 5 J. OF L. &
POL. 459, 460 n.4 (1989). Political scientist Mark J. Rozell published a piece on the Nixon pardon
in a social science journal entitled President Ford’s Pardon of Richard M. Nixon: Constitutional
and Political Considerations, 24 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 121 (1994).
4. For a commentary on the Nixon pardon and negotiations over his presidential records
published within this time period, see Laura Kalman, Gerald Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and the
Rise of the Right, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 349 (2010).
5. Benton Becker, The History of the Nixon Pardon, Speech at the Cordell Hull Speakers
Forum (Feb. 3, 2000), in 30 CUMB. L. REV. 31, 31–49 (1999–2000).
6. Rep. Henry Hyde and Sen. George Mitchell debated a North pardon in the pages of the
American Bar Association Journal. See Henry Hyde & George Mitchell, Pardoning Ollie North,
75 A.B.A. J. 42 (1989).
7. For a detailed look at the Iran-Contra scandal and pardons, see CROUCH, supra note 2, at
101–07.
8. Not discussed here are Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Re-
tributive Justice: Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 413 (1999) and Julian H. Wright Jr., Pardon in the Hebrew
Bible and Modern Law, 3 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (1993). Wright published a shorter version of this
article as Julian H. Wright Jr., Modern Pardons: Lessons from the Hebrew Bible, 114/115 LAW &
JUST. CHRISTIAN L. REV. 109 (1992).
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A. Iran-Contra Pardons
In an issue of the Houston Law Review published in 1992, Stephen
Carter discussed Iran-Contra in a brief essay entitled “The Iran-Contra Par-
don Mess,” and Harold Koh contributed an even shorter piece: “Begging
Bush’s Pardon.”9
Others weighed in with lengthier analyses.10 Did Bush use the pardon
power less as a means to show mercy to Weinberger and others, and more
as a way to protect himself from legal exposure? Two articles appearing
back-to-back in an issue of the Oklahoma Law Review examined: (1)
whether a pardon could stop an investigator from obtaining information
from her target, and (2) whether a president could “self-pardon.”
B. Pardon Granted in Context of Investigation
In the first article, Charles Berger analyzed whether a presidential par-
don impeded the ability of investigators to obtain important information
from the targets of their inquiry.11 Looking at the Nixon and Iran-Contra
pardons, he concluded that “[t]he failure [of investigators] to obtain infor-
mation was the result of a lack of political will . . . not because of the
pardon enabling the offender to remain silent with impunity.”12 In the case
of Nixon, Berger pointed out that investigators still had leverage over Rich-
ard Nixon despite President Ford’s pardon: clemency did not prevent Con-
gress from impeaching Nixon in order to remove his post-presidential
benefits package.13 Regarding Iran-Contra, Berger argued that Lawrence
Walsh, the special prosecutor, “was simply wrong that President Bush
blocked further investigation into the Iran-Contra affair by pardoning Cas-
par Weinberger.”14 To Berger, Walsh had other “alternatives to a criminal
trial” that he chose not to use.15
9. Stephen L. Carter, The Iran-Contra Pardon Mess, 29 HOUS. L. REV 883 (1992); Harold
Hongju Koh, Begging Bush’s Pardon, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 889 (1992).
10. See Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the
Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (1993). A University of Richmond Law
Review published in Winter 1993 collected a number of clemency pieces from an earlier sympo-
sium at the law school. Directly relevant here are two of those works: first, a note, James N.
Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President’s Prerogative to Escape Accounta-
bility, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345 (1993); and an article, Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good
and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH L. REV. 281 (1993).
11. Charles D. Berger, The Effect of Presidential Pardons on Disclosure of Information: Is
our Cynicism Justified?, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 163 (1999).
12. Id. at 192.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 193.
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C. Self-pardon
Directly following Berger’s article, Robert Nida and Rebecca Spiro
analyze whether a president may “self-pardon.”16 They point out that “only
two chief executives have contemplated issuing a self-pardon”: Nixon dur-
ing Watergate and Bush in the context of Iran-Contra.17 They view the Iran-
Contra pardons by George H.W. Bush as “a constructive self-pardon for his
alleged conduct” and argue that although Nixon decided to let Gerald Ford
decide his fate, Nixon believed that he had the ability to self-pardon.18 The
authors agree with Nixon’s interpretation, concluding that “[t]he textual,
historical, structural, and precedential arguments set forth in this article in-
dicate that the President of the United States has the power to issue pardons
to any individual, including himself, except to overturn an impeachment.”19
Brian Kalt disagrees with Nida and Spiro.20 He argues that “[p]residents
cannot pardon themselves”21 for a number of reasons, including the impor-
tant fact that “[i]t clashes with other established provisions in the Constitu-
tion that prevent self-judging and self-dealing.”22
D. Standards/Reasons for Clemency
How should clemency be administered? According to Daniel Kobil,
“clemency often operates as an arbitrary exception to our system of justice,
rather than as a corrective.”23 He urges that “the remission of punishment
must be administered in a principled, consistent fashion,” and proposes
“specific procedures and standards to govern the exercise of the clemency
power.”24 Kobil’s article is particularly useful to a clemency researcher for
two reasons: first, it is weighty: Kobil skillfully covers a number of basic
but crucial topics in Part II; second, it is timely—here, he argues for bifur-
cation of the clemency process between the president and a new, politically
neutral “clemency commission.”25 Many scholars are currently calling for
clemency reform,26 and Kobil’s piece offers one possible template for
change. Echoing Kobil, philosopher Kathleen Dean Moore argues that
16. Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197 (1999).
17. Id. at 212.
18. Id. at 213–14.
19. Id. at 222.
20. Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons,
106 YALE L.J. 779 (1996).
21. Id. at 809.
22. Id. at 802.
23. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the
King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 574 (1991).
24. Id. at 575.
25. Id. at 622.
26. See Douglas A. Berman, Turning Hope-and-Change Talk Into Clemency Action for Non-
violent Drug Offenders, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 59 (2010); Rachel E.
Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for
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“presidents should make pardoning decisions on the basis of reasons and
that those reasons should be made public”; she also contends “it is possible
to specify in advance the general kinds of cases that call for pardons.”27
E. Posthumous Pardons
Other pieces published in the 1990s do not necessarily spend much
time on the Nixon or Iran-Contra pardons, but they are notable nevertheless.
For example, in 2008, George W. Bush earned media attention by issuing
what journalists labeled a “rare” posthumous pardon to Charles T. Win-
ters.28 In fact, there has apparently been just one additional posthumous
pardon granted in American history: Henry Ossian Flipper became the first
person to receive one just nine years earlier.29 His attorneys published their
legal brief supporting Flipper’s application as a law review article. Flipper,
the first African-American to graduate from West Point, was court-mar-
tialed and discharged from the Army because of racial discrimination.30
F. Effect of a Pardon
How far back in time may a pardon reach to excuse the actions of its
recipient? Philip Houle argues that “a full and unconditional pardon blots
out both the legal existence of a conviction or crime and any resulting guilt
or infamy, subject to four well-defined common law exceptions or limits to
the operation and effect of full pardons.”31 He contends that the Supreme
Court “unequivocally adopted the forgive-and-forget rule” in Ex Parte Gar-
land.32 This interpretation is contrary to a persuasive piece written by Pro-
fessor Samuel Williston over seven decades ago in which he argued that
even a “full and unconditional pardon does not blot out guilt or moral stain
due to the ‘admission’ of guilt implied in the acceptance of a pardon and the
four traditional exceptions or limits to the operation of full pardons at com-
Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2015); Evan P. Schultz, Does the Fox Control Pardons in the
Henhouse?, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 177 (2001); and possibly others.
27. Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV.
281, 281 (1993). Moore cites Daniel T. Kobil’s The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the
Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1990–1991) as a source for the law-
oriented version of her argument. She also refers the reader to her own book on the subject,
KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989), for a
longer, philosophy-oriented explanation.
28. Ariane DeVogue & Theresa Cook, Presidential Pardon for ‘Unsung Hero,’ ABC NEWS
(Dec. 23, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/BushLegacy/story?id=6519124.
29. Darryl W. Jackson, Jeffrey J. Smith, Edward J. Sisson & Helene T. Krasnoff, Bending
Toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon of Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 1251,
1251 (1999).
30. Id. at 1252.
31. Philip P. Houle, Forgive and Forget: Honoring Full and Unconditional Pardons, 41 ME.
L. REV. 273, 275 (1989).
32. Id. at 276; Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
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mon law.”33 Ashley Steiner also disagrees with Houle, contending that
“courts should adopt the view . . . that a presidential pardon removes the
punishment for an offense, but cannot erase the guilt for the underlying acts
or the fact of conviction.”34 She dismisses as dicta the language in Ex Parte
Garland that seems to embrace Houle’s “forgive-and-forget” rule, and notes
that subsequent courts “have understood Garland to stand for a much more
limited principle.”35 She concludes that “[a]n examination of constitutional
principles and Supreme Court interpretation shows that the view of the
North and Abrams majorities36 is the more practical and just.”37
III. THE 2000S
A. Bill Clinton and Clemency
George H.W. Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, was president from 1993
to 2001. During his two terms in office, he granted a number of notable
pardons and commutations. Among those clemency recipients are: Clin-
ton’s half-brother, Roger Clinton, Whitewater figure Susan McDougal,
and—perhaps most controversially—members of the FALN and Marc
Rich.
1. The FALN
The FALN was a Puerto Rican nationalist terrorist organization. Six-
teen of their members, whose offenses were for “weapons and conspiracy
charges,” as well as “interference with interstate commerce,”38 were offered
conditional clemency by President Clinton in 1999 despite the fact that they
were not considered strong candidates for presidential mercy by the law
enforcement agencies responsible for prosecuting them.39 Observers sus-
33. Id. at 274 n.5.
34. Ashley M. Steiner, Remission of Guilt or Removal of Punishment? The Effects of a Presi-
dential Pardon, 46 EMORY L.J. 959, 962 (1997).
35. Id. at 969.
36. Interestingly enough, the North (Oliver North) and Abrams (Elliott Abrams) cases both
stemmed from Iran-Contra. In re North had to do with Clair George’s attempt to recover moneys
paid to his attorneys after he received a presidential pardon. George had been convicted of lying to
Congress in connection with Iran-Contra. Another figure from the scandal, Abrams had claimed
that, consistent with an expansive reading of Garland, his presidential pardon made matters as if
he had never committed the crime in the first place. The courts disagreed with both George’s and
Abrams’ claims. See App. C, Effect of a Pardon on Bar Discipline, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 217
(2001).
37. Steiner, supra note 34, at 1003.
38. John M. Broder, 12 Imprisoned Puerto Ricans Accept Clemency Conditions, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/08/us/12-imprisoned-puerto-ricans-accept-clem
ency-conditions.html?pagewanted=all.
39. CROUCH, supra note 2, at 108–09. For a summary of the FALN commutations, see
CROUCH, supra note 2, at 108–11.
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pected, and evidence suggested, that Clinton had offered conditional clem-
ency for largely political reasons.40
2. Marc Rich
Marc Rich is one of the lucky 176 recipients of clemency in the dwin-
dling hours of the Clinton presidency. Rich, a fugitive hiding in Switzerland
to avoid prosecution for “widespread tax evasion, illegal dealings with Iran
and other crimes,”41 was the beneficiary of a clemency campaign partici-
pated in by his ex-wife Denise, who had made large, recent donations to the
Clinton presidential library.42
B. Federal Sentencing Reporter (2000–2001)
The Federal Sentencing Reporter published its November/December
2000 and its January/February 2001 journals as one double issue in order to
more comprehensively consider the clemency power and criminal sentences
in the wake of Clinton’s last-minute decisions.43 In over a dozen articles,
scholars reflected on the following topics: (1) international clemency; (2)
“systematic” pardons; (3) the pardon as a prerogative of the president; (4)
whether the president should publicly release reasons for clemency deci-
sions; (5) using clemency as a tool of mercy; (6) whether President Clinton
might use clemency for personal reasons; (7) practitioners’ perspectives on
several Clinton clemency decisions; (8) who should review applications for
clemency; and (9) the appendices to the special issue of Federal Sentencing
Reporter.44 The issue ends with reprints of several important documents
related to the Clinton clemency decisions.45
Regular journal editors Daniel Freed and Steven Chanenson preview
the special double issue and its topics and contributors.46 Then, guest editor
Margaret Love begins the issue with a look at the historical development of
40. Id. at 110–11.
41. Douglas Martin, Marc Rich, Financier and Famous Fugitive, Dies at 78, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/business/marc-rich-pardoned-financier-
dies-at-78.html.
42. For a look at the Marc Rich clemency campaign, see id. at 112–17. For a discussion of
the impact that lobbying laws (or the lack thereof) had on the Rich pardon campaign, see Kathryn
L. Plemmons, “Lobbying Activities” and Presidential Pardons: Will Legislators’ Efforts to
Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-Lined Jurisprudence?, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 131
(2003–2004).
43. Daniel J. Freed & Steven L. Chanenson, Pardon Power and Sentencing Policy, 13 FED.
SENT’G REP. 119, 120 (2001). Two pieces in this double issue, Elizabeth Rapaport’s The Georgia
Immigration Pardons: A Case Study in Mass Clemency, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 184 (2001) and
Mary Price’s The Other Safety Valve: Sentence Reduction Motions under 18 U.S.C.
§3582(c)(1)(A), 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 188 (2001), are not mentioned here because they do not deal
directly with federal executive clemency.
44. Freed & Chanenson, supra note 43.
45. Id. at 192–240.
46. Id. at 119–91.
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the executive bureaucracy designed to assist the president with clemency
decisions.47 From there, she also introduces the other authors and briefly
previews their main arguments.48
1. International Clemency
David Tait writes the first of five articles here on the big picture of
clemency. He focuses on “two apparently similar murder trials in France
and Canada, illustrating two constitutional settings of pardon.”49 Tait’s
piece is generally outside the scope of the main concerns of this article.
However, he does provide a useful—if compact—history of clemency,
from the Code of Hammurabi through President Abraham Lincoln and
beyond.50
2. “Systematic” Pardons
Charles Shanor and Marc Miller follow Tait with an article aimed at
“systematic” clemency. By “systematic,” the authors mean clemency “ap-
plied to a group of offenders selected through consistent criteria and
processes, and for reasons that may reflect concerns of justice, equality, and
wise policy, rather than mercy.”51 Shanor and Miller argue that “[a]t least a
third of all United States presidents . . . have used systematic pardons,” and
include a helpful chart that lists their examples.52 They track clemency’s
decline through charts covering Presidents Nixon through Clinton, and also
include a graphic that demonstrates how large the federal prison population
has grown in recent years.53
Perhaps the most important feature of the Shanor and Miller article is
how it foreshadows recent clemency developments under President Barack
Obama. The authors suggest (in an article published a decade and a half
ago) that the president may wish to use clemency to bring typically harsh
sentences for crack cocaine violations more in line with the usually more
lenient sentences for powder cocaine.54 Fast forward nearly a decade, and
Shanor and Miller seem to predict President Obama’s activity on this issue:
in 2010, Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act and brought a 100 to 1
punishing disparity between the two types of cocaine offenses down to 18
47. Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Theory and Prac-
tice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 125–27 (2001).
48. Id. at 128–30.
49. David Tait, Pardons in Perspective: The Role of Forgiveness in Criminal Justice, 13
FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 134 (2001).
50. Id. at 134–35.
51. Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential Pardons, 13 FED.
SENT’G REP. 139, 139 (2001).
52. Id. at 139–40.
53. Id. at 140–41.
54. Id. at 139.
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to 1.55 More recently, he has been using sentence commutations to address
disproportionate sentences handed out previously to minor, non-violent
drug offenders.56
3. Pardon as Prerogative
In his article, John Harrison discusses the ways in which pardons
“have been and could be put,” and whether they have been called upon as a
Lockean “prerogative” power.57 This is a thoughtful discussion that touches
upon several examples of recent controversial pardons (e.g., Nixon, Iran-
Contra, Marc Rich).58
4. Providing Reasons for Clemency
Daniel Kobil revisits the idea of a president explaining why he is par-
doning someone in his article, “Should Clemency Decisions be Subject to a
Reasons Requirement?”59 He notes that “[t]oday, as President Clinton’s
pardon of Marc Rich illustrates, detailed explanations for clemency have
usually accompanied only the most controversial exercises of the power.”60
Kobil goes on to discuss the Nixon and Iran-Contra pardons as well.61 After
examining the positive and negative aspects of requiring a president to pro-
vide reasons for a clemency decision,62 Kobil concludes that “[u]pon reflec-
tion, I do not favor disparaging the clemency power by mandating a reasons
requirement.”63
5. Clemency as a Tool of Mercy
In an article that only briefly touches upon the president’s clemency
power, John Steer, a U.S. Sentencing Commission official, and Paula
Biderman, an attorney with the U.S. Parole Commission, discuss the
power’s role within the larger context of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (the “SRA”).64 They observe that “because no guideline or statutory
system can perfectly address all individual circumstances, the President’s
55. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372.
56. Sari Horwitz & Juliet Eilperin, Obama Commutes Sentences of 46 Nonviolent Drug Of-
fenders, WASH. POST (July 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
obama-commutes-sentences-of-46-non-violent-drugoffenders/2015/07/13/b533f61e-2974-11e5-
a250-42bd812efc09_story.html.
57. John Harrison, Pardon as Prerogative, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 147, 147 (2000).
58. Id. at 147–49.
59. Daniel T. Kobil, Should Clemency Decisions Be Subject to A Reasons Requirement?, 13
FED. SENT’G REP. 150 (2001).
60. Id. at 150.
61. Id. at 151.
62. Id. at 151–52.
63. Id. at 152.
64. John R. Steer & Paula K. Biderman, Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on the
President’s Power to Commute Sentences, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 154 (2001).
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power to commute a sentence in exceptional, deserving cases continues to
be an appropriate mechanism for advancing the idealistic principles of the
SRA in a society that strives to temper the exercise of punishment with
mercy when appropriate.”65
6. Inappropriate Pardons Granted for Personal Reasons
Several contributors to this special issue of the Federal Sentencing Re-
porter zero in more closely on the Clinton pardons. Kathleen Dean Moore’s
contribution here originally ran as an op-ed in the Washington Post a week
before the end of Clinton’s presidency,66 so it missed the Marc Rich and
other “last minute” clemency decisions that came out as the president left
the Oval Office for the last time. Moore notes that “[u]sing a pardon to pay
for something given in return is corruption—pure and simple.”67 Compared
to the outright sale of a pardon, “[g]iving pardons to reward political loyalty
or encourage campaign donations or express gratitude for personal favors
differs only in degree.”68 Of course, a media investigation after the Rich
pardon granted on Clinton’s last day in office uncovered a behind-the-
scenes campaign and the fact that Rich’s ex-wife had donated almost a half-
million dollars to Clinton’s presidential library.69
7. Practitioners’ Perspectives on Clinton’s Clemency Actions
Judge David Doty and former federal prosecutors Deborah Devaney
and David Zlotnick provide fascinating behind-the-scenes perspectives on
Clinton clemency decisions. Judge Doty writes about two offenders (Kim
Willis and Carlos Vignali) he sentenced that later received clemency.70 For
various reasons, Judge Doty supported the Willis commutation, but did not
know about, and disagreed with, the Vignali clemency decision.71 Devaney
offers a detailed look at a pair of Clinton’s clemency decisions,72 but the
FALN commutations are the most relevant of the two for our purposes.
Regarding those controversial commutations, she argues that President
Clinton “ignored the trial prosecutors,” who “knew nothing of what was
going on” even while FALN supporters lobbied the president for their free-
65. Id. at 157.
66. Kathleen D. Moore, Mr. President, Misusing This Power Is Unpardonable, 13 FED.
SENT’G REP. 159 (2001).
67. Id. at 159.
68. Id.
69. CROUCH, supra note 2, at 112–14.
70. David S. Doty, Clemency: A View from the Bench of Two Commutations – Vignali and
Willis, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 161 (2001).
71. Id. at 161–62.
72. See Deborah A. Devaney, A Voice for Victims: What Prosecutors Can Add to the Pro-
cess, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 163 (2001) (focusing on sentence commutations that Clinton offered to
Democratic fundraiser Dorothy Rivers and to members of the FALN).
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dom.73 Finally, Zlotnick reminds us that some commutations granted by
President Clinton were sound, and provides examples of how prosecutors
can play a positive role in clemency decisions.74
8. Reviewing Clemency Applications
One of the questions covered by two authors in this special issue re-
mains a particularly important concern today: who should review clemency
applications before they reach the president? Evan Schultz’s article asks
whether the “fox controls the henhouse” when it comes to clemency.75 One
aspect of his argument contains the observation that recent presidents—
including Clinton—may have decided to bypass the Pardon Attorney’s Of-
fice because “the pardoning process seems to have been captured by the
very prosecutors who run our inevitably flawed criminal justice system.”76
To Schultz, “[t]he real solution is removal of the [clemency screening] pro-
cess from [the] Justice [Department].”77 Schultz’s argument has company
among a number of scholars who advocate major changes in the clemency
screening process.78 Brian Hoffstadt offers a review and critique of Sch-
ultz’s article, with whom he both agrees and disagrees. One major point of
departure between Schultz and Hoffstadt is that the latter suggests that
“moving the process completely outside the Justice Department . . . may not
be necessary.”79
9. Original Documents Reproduced in Appendices
Four helpful appendices that reprint documents related to topics dis-
cussed by the authors round out this special issue of Federal Sentencing
Reporter.80 The first appendix reproduces “rules of the pardon process,”
that is, the Justice Department’s clemency regulations.81 This information is
also available on the Pardon Attorney’s Office website.82 In addition, it
reproduces excerpts from the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual as “Guidance for
73. Id. at 164.
74. David M. Zlotnick, Federal Prosecutors and the Clemency Power, 13 FED. SENT’G REP.
168 (2001).
75. Evan P. Schultz, Does the Fox Control Pardons in the Henhouse? 13 FED. SENT’G REP.
177 (2001).
76. Id. at 178.
77. Id.
78. For another argument to remove the clemency screening process from the Department of
Justice altogether, see Daniel Kobil, Reviving Presidential Clemency in Cases of ‘Unfortunate
Guilt’, 21 FED SENT’G REP. 160 (2008); see also Berman and Barkow & Osler, supra note 26.
79. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Guarding the Integrity of the Clemency Power, 13 FED. SENT’G REP.
180, 181 (2001).
80. I will discuss only Appendices A–C here, as they have wider implications than Appendix
D, which looks solely at Bill Clinton-specific information.
81. App. A, Justice Department Clemency Regulations, 13 FED SENT’G REP. 193 (2001).
82. See Rules Governing Petitions for Executive Clemency, DEP’T OF JUST.  (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/rules-governing-petitions-executive-clemency.
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United States Attorneys in Clemency Matters.”83 The second appendix con-
tains some of the foundational works of the body of clemency literature,
including: Alexander Hamilton’s remarks on clemency from Federalist No.
74;84 relevant excerpts from the multi-volume 1939 work The Attorney
General’s Survey of Release Procedures;85 selections from several Annual
Reports of the Pardon Attorney (for 1960, 1963–65);86 President Gerald
Ford’s statement made upon signing the Nixon pardon—along with the lan-
guage of the pardon proclamation itself;87 and finally, George H.W. Bush’s
pardon proclamation for the Iran-Contra defendants he pardoned.88 The
third appendix consists of: Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger’s
memo on the effect of a pardon;89 excerpts from In re Elliott Abrams,
which looks at Abrams’ claim that his pardon should have a comprehensive
impact, such as one could derive from a broad interpretation of Garland;90
and an op-ed by Webb Hubbell about how his life changed following a
felony conviction.91 The material in Appendix D is useful as a source for
background information on several aspects of Bill Clinton’s pardoning
decisions.92
C. Capital University Law Review (2003)
Not too long after Bill Clinton’s controversial final acts of clemency,
Capital University Law School hosted a symposium entitled “Forgiveness
& the Law: Executive Clemency and the American System of Justice.”93
The issues covered by participants in the symposium included: (1) whether
the Constitution should be amended to impose additional restrictions on the
83. App. A, Guidance for United States Attorneys in Clemency Matters, 13 FED SENT’G REP.
195–97 (2001).
84. App. B, Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 74, 13 FED SENT’G REP. 198 (2001).
85. App. B, The Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures, 13 FED SENT’G REP. 199
(2001).
86. App. B, Annual Reports of the Pardon Attorney (1960, 1963–65), 13 FED SENT’G REP.
205 (2001).
87. App. B, President Gerald Ford’s Pardon of Richard Nixon, 13 FED SENT’G REP. 207
(2001).
88. App. B, President George Bush’s Pardon of the Iran-Contra Defendants, 13 FED SENT’G
REP. 209 (2001).
89. App. C, Effects of a Pardon on Authority to Deport, Firearms Disability, and Remission
of Restitution, 13 FED SENT’G REP. 211 (2001).
90. App. C, supra note 36, at 217.
91. App. C, Without Pardon: Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction, 13 FED
SENT’G REP. 223–24 (2001).
92. See App. D, Clinton Era Cases and Comments 13 FED SENT’G REP. 225–40 (2001).
93. See Richard F. Celeste, Executive Clemency: One Executive’s Real Life Decisions, 31
CAP. U. L. REV. 139, 139–42 (2003). Not included here, but nevertheless interesting, are pieces by
the symposium’s organizer, Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31
CAP U. L. REV. 139, 219–42 (2003); Richard F. Celeste, Executive Clemency: One Executive’s
Real Life Decisions, 31 CAP U. L. REV. 139, 139–42 (2003); P.E. Digeser, Justice, Forgiveness,
Mercy, and Forgetting: The Complex Meaning of Executive Pardoning, 31 CAP U. L. REV. 139,
161–78 (2003).
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clemency power; (2) the role of the media regarding clemency; and (3) the
importance of the clemency screening process to the legitimacy of its
output.
1. Curbing Clemency
In light of Clinton’s “last minute” pardons, should the president’s abil-
ity to grant clemency be limited? Mark Strasser reviews the various curbs
already restraining clemency and concludes that, on balance, “it seems clear
that there is no need for a constitutional amendment to curb presidential
abuses of the pardon power, even if that does mean that we can reasonably
expect more embarrassing commutations in the not-too-distant future.”94
2. Clemency and Press Coverage
George Lardner admits that, when it comes to the media and clemency
coverage, they “sometimes do[ ] a lousy job.”95 Although the press can
watch for clemency decisions, they are usually limited to “chasing it after
the fact.”96 Lardner argues that “the secrecy of the clemency process is one
of the main reasons for its shaky status.”97 As an example, he notes that
“[e]ven the reasons the Attorney General had for recommending clemency,
published each year for decades in annual reports starting in the 1880s, are
now withheld on the grounds that disclosure might chill the deliberative
process at the White House.”98 He concludes that “the role of the press”
should be to continue to point out flaws in our criminal justice system.99
Lardner has made his own recent contribution to fighting secrecy by win-
ning a lawsuit that requires the Pardon Attorney’s Office to disclose the
names of applicants who were denied clemency.100
3. The Clemency Screening Process
In her piece on the Clinton pardons, Margaret Love “focuses not so
much on the merits of particular grants as on the process that produced
94. Mark Strasser, Some Reflections on the President’s Pardon Power, 31 CAP. U. L. REV.
143, 159 (2003).
95. George Lardner, The Role of the Press in the Clemency Process, 31 CAP U. L. REV. 179,
179 (2003).
96. Id. at 180.
97. Id. at 181.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 184.
100. See Lardner v. Dep’t of Just., 638 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2009). Lardner is also co-
authoring a history of clemency based on National Archives records. An interesting piece drawing
upon old pardon archives is George Lardner Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences
and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 FED. SENT’G REP
212 (2003).
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them.”101 She explores the commutations of Kim Willis and Carlos Vignali
and looks at how differences in the processes that led to each impacted their
public perception.102 She begins with a detailed look at the behind-the-
scenes clemency process that had been in place for decades before Clinton
took office, noting that the “seeds of the breakdown of the pardon advisory
process” witnessed during Clinton’s term were actually sown during the
Carter years.103 What was the problem? “By the time President Clinton en-
tered office in 1993, the pardon program at Justice had lost whatever inde-
pendence and integrity it once enjoyed within the Department, and was
functioning primarily to ratify the results achieved by prosecutors, not to
provide any real possibility of revising them.”104 In response, Clinton “felt
unable to depend upon the Justice Department for pardon recommenda-
tions, and had decided to work around this problem by using his own White
House staff.”105 Using the Willis and Vignali cases as examples, Love ar-
gues that the “textbook” Willis commutation came after a normal bureau-
cratic process and was met with “a measure of public acceptance,” while
the Vignali decision—facilitated by a paid advocate who turned out to be
Hugh Rodham, the First Lady’s brother—did not.106
D. George W. Bush and the I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby Commutation
A special counsel investigation into whether someone in the Bush ad-
ministration leaked Valerie Plame’s secret identity as a CIA operative to a
journalist led to the indictment of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby for five felo-
nies.107 Libby, the vice president’s former chief of staff, was a trusted con-
fidante of the president and vice president who chose not to testify on his
own behalf, make a plea deal, or call the vice president to testify at trial.108
Following his conviction and sentence to thirty months in prison, plus a
large fine, Bush commuted Libby’s sentence to zero time in confinement in
July 2007.109 Bush only issued eleven commutations in his two terms as
president.110
101. Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last Pardons, 31
CAP. U. L. REV. 185, 186 (2003).
102. Id. at 186, 187.
103. Id. at 192.
104. Id. at 193.
105. Id. at 195.
106. Id. at 216.
107. CROUCH, supra note 2, at 117–20.
108. Id. at 120–21.
109. Id. at 122–23.
110. Clemency Statistics, DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics#
w-bush (last updated Nov. 5, 2015).
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E. Federal Sentencing Reporter (2007)
Douglas Berman and Alyson White dedicated the October 2007 issue
of Federal Sentencing Reporter to clemency-related issues.111As noted by
the editors in their brief explanation of the Libby case, the purpose of the
issue is to “seek[ ] to explore the Libby case through the lens of sentencing
law and policy.”112 Though an important and worthy goal, I will concen-
trate here less on the sentencing aspects and more on the articles that di-
rectly address clemency. The articles discussed below cover the following
topics: (1) restoring clemency to its former important role in the criminal
justice system; (2) improving the process for obtaining a sentence commu-
tation; and (3) reproductions of important documents related to the Libby
commutation.
1. Restoring Clemency
Margaret Love leads off with an overview of pardoning, raises a num-
ber of justifications for it, and notes several questions that a president
should answer about how to use it. Overall, she “describes the historical use
of the power, explains how pardon fell into disuse and disrepute late in the
last century, and proposes that pardon can and should be restored to a useful
and respectable role in our present-day justice system, and in our national
politics.”113 She lists four justifications for why a president should try to
restore the pardon power to a prominent place:
Federal criminal law has produced a great deal of injustice for
which only pardon provides a remedy[;] Pardoning is the most
immediate way for the president to communicate his law enforce-
ment priorities to executive officials, including prosecutors[;] Par-
don allows the president to advance his criminal justice agenda
with Congress and the public[;] Pardon is susceptible to misuse,
real and imagined, when it is not gainfully employed in the ser-
vice of the justice system[.]114
111. Articles not considered here are Stephanos Bibas, Rita v. United States Leaves More
Open Than It Answers, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 28 (2007); Keith Heidmann, Can I Get What Lewis
Libby Got?, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 23 (2007); and Glenn Schmitt, Lou Reedt, & Kenneth Cohen,
USSC Staff Analysis of the Impact of the Crack Cocaine Amendment if Made Retroactive, 20 FED.
SENT’G REP. 65 (2007). Heidmann’s piece overlaps somewhat with Gill’s, in that much of it is a
review of the clemency application process before it turns to a discussion of the Rita case. The
article does offer a valuable chart comparing the pardon and commutation grants of presidents
from Nixon through George W. Bush. This and related information is also available on the pardon
attorney’s website. See Office of the Pardon Attorney, DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
pardon (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
112. Douglas A. Berman & Alyson S. White, Looking at the Libby Case from a Sentencing
Perspective, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1 (2007).
113. Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President’s Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT’G REP.
5, 5 (2007).
114. Id. at 8–9.
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She warns that “without either a clearly defined role or a reliable system for
management, pardon is susceptible to abuse, real and imagined, as evi-
denced by the public response to the final Clinton grants and by President
Bush’s Libby commutation.”115
2. Improving the Commutation Process
Molly Gill116 follows Love with a close look at the commutation appli-
cation process.117 Citing a piece by pardon attorney staffer Samuel Mori-
son,118 she reviews the logistics of the commutation application process.119
Then, she considers the drawn-out, frustrating road faced by commutation
petitioners.120 Finally, she offers specific steps that the president could take
to improve the process, including: eliminating “conflicted and unnecessary
middlemen, the deputy attorney general and the Office of the [White
House] Counsel”; creating an “efficient, regularized commutation applica-
tion process” from his first days in office; and “most importantly” working
with the Office of the Pardon Attorney to “establish a timeline for disposing
of applications in an efficient manner.”121
3. Reproductions of Libby-related Documents
The final pages of this issue contain reprints of documents related to
the Libby case, including his attorneys’ sentencing memo,122 the sentencing
memo filed by the special counsel prosecuting his case,123 and President
Bush’s public announcement of Libby’s commutation.124 At a congres-
sional hearing on clemency following the commutation, several experts tes-
tified, including Thomas Cochran, Victor Rita’s attorney,125 and professor
115. Id. at 12.
116. Gill is a staff attorney for Families Against Mandatory Minimums. She also authored a
brief letter published in June 2008 offering advice on clemency to presidential hopefuls John
McCain (R-AZ) and Barack Obama (D-IL). See Molly M. Gill, Clemency Today, Reform To-
morrow, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 318 (2008).
117. Molly M. Gill, Into the Bottomless Black Box: The Prisoner’s Perspective on the Com-
mutation Process, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 16 (2007).
118. Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive Clem-
ency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2005).
119. Gill, supra note 117, at 16–18.
120. Id. at 18–19.
121. Id. at 19–20.
122. Theodore V. Wells Jr., James L. Brochin, William H. Jeffress Jr., Alex J. Bourelly &
John D. Cline, Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of I. Lewis Libby in US v. Libby, CR. NO. 05-
394 (RBW), 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 33–34 (2007).
123. Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Government’s Sentencing Memorandum in U.S. v. Libby, CR. NO.
05-394 (RBW), 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 44–48 (2007).
124. George W. Bush, Statement by the President on Executive Clemency for Lewis Libby, 20
FED. SENT’G REP. 49 (2007).
125. Thomas Cochran, Statement of Thomas Cochran, Esq. before the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Judiciary Committee on “The Use and Misuse of Presidential Clemency Power for
Executive Branch Officials,” 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 50–53 (2007) (Cochran’s testimony and
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and sentencing expert Douglas Berman.126 Judge Reggie Walton’s ruling
following Libby’s commutation is also included.127
F. Other Publications
Law students and scholars published a number of other important
pieces on clemency during this decade outside of these special issues and
conferences.128 Among the issues addressed are: (1) whether to amend the
Constitution to prevent future presidents from abusing the pardon power;
(2) whether Congress has (or should have) a role to play in clemency mat-
ters; (3) how a conditional clemency grant operates; and (4) miscellaneous
“nuts and bolts” about how the clemency bureaucracy and the philosophy
behind pardoning operate.
1. Amend the Constitution to Address Clemency Abuse?
a. No:
Jerry Carannante’s “What to Do About the Executive Clemency Power
in the Wake of the Clinton Presidency” is another piece focusing on Bill
Clinton and clemency.129 Here, the author reviews the mechanics of clem-
ency, its history, famous American clemency decisions and legal cases, and
conducts an analysis of the Clinton pardons.130 He argues that “the answer
as to what should Constitutionally be done in the wake of the Clinton Presi-
dency is quite simple: absolutely nothing.”131 He reviews the arguments of
the Framers of the Constitution and decides that, despite reformers’ con-
cerns, the best course of action is to trust their judgment.132 He warns, how-
Berman’s testimony are switched in the Table of Contents for this issue of Federal Sentencing
Reporter).
126. Douglas A. Berman, Written Statement of Professor Douglas A. Berman before the U.S.
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee on “The Use and Misuse of Presidential Clemency
Power for Executive Branch Officials,” 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 50, 54–60 (2007).
127. United States v. I. Lewis Libby, 495 F.Supp.2d 49 (D.D.C. 2007), 20 Fed. Sent’g Rep.
61–64 (2007).
128. Included in that number are CROUCH, supra note 2, and two books with chapters dedi-
cated to the pardon power: BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR
PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES (2012) (Kalt’s book technically belongs in the following section
dedicated to scholarship from the 2010s) and HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005).
Among those pieces that are interesting yet fall outside the scope of this review essay are Rachel
E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 153
(2009) (state clemency); Jonathan Harris & Lothlo´rien Redmond, Executive Clemency: The Lethal
Absence of Hope, 3 AM. U. CRIM. L. BR. 2 (2007) (state clemency/death penalty); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and Commutations, 38 J.
LEGAL STUD. 61 (2009) (uses pardon data to test model); and Jaired Stallard, Abuse of the Pardon
Power: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 103 (2002).
129. Jerry Carannante, What to Do About the Executive Clemency Power in the Wake of the
Clinton Presidency, 47 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 325 (2003).
130. Id. at 326.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 342–47.
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ever, that “the real danger is that the historical controversies over Nixon,
Iran-Contra, etc., and the Clinton controversy will create an atrophy of the
pardon power to the point that its inherent benefits to the general welfare
will be lost even absent any reform.”133
In a piece published in 2008, Kristen Fowler compares clemency prac-
tices set by state constitutions with the federal system of executive clem-
ency, concluding that “despite its flaws, the current federal pardon power
provides for the most effective power with the least room for abuse.”134
b. Yes:
Paul Haase offers a contrary take to Carannante on the proper institu-
tional response to the Clinton pardons.135 First, he reviews Clinton’s contro-
versial clemency decisions, the history of clemency, the language of the
Constitution, federal regulations related to clemency, and a list of cases
relevant to the topic.136 He then turns to various limits on the pardon-power
and reform proposals.137 He concludes that major reform is needed, and that
a “constitutional amendment modifying the 1974 proposed amendment,138
while difficult to secure, is the best option for limiting the pardon
power.”139
With the final Clinton pardons in mind,140 Gregory Sisk suggests a
way to alter the clemency system to prevent similar future incidents: adopt
Rep. Barney Frank’s suggested amendment that would alter the Constitu-
tion to prevent a president from using the clemency power between October
1 of a presidential election year and the following January 21.141
2. Other Reform Plans
Jonathan Menitove advocates reform in the shape of “a small, partisan
Presidential Clemency Board to review and approve all presidential par-
dons.”142 Menitove reviews clemency’s history and sees “both strengths
133. Id. at 352.
134. Kristen H. Fowler, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L.J. 1651, 1653 (2008).
135. Paul J. Haase, “Oh My Darling Clemency”: Existing or Possible Limitations on the Use
of the Presidential Pardon Power, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1287 (2002).
136. Id. at 1288–98.
137. Id. at 1299–1306.
138. Here, he refers to a constitutional amendment proposed in 1974 by then-Senator Walter
Mondale that would have allowed Congress to disapprove a presidential pardon if a two-thirds
vote of each chamber could be achieved within 180 days of the grant. Haase would modify that
language to allow the Senate alone to disapprove of a pardon if a two-thirds vote of that chamber
was reached within sixty days of the controversial clemency grant. See id. at 1304.
139. Id. at 1307.
140. Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the Pardon Power During the Twilight of a Presidential
Term, 67 MO. L. REV. 13, 14–16 (2002).
141. Id. at 26–27.
142. Jonathan T. Menitove, The Problematic Presidential Pardon: A Proposal for Reforming
Federal Clemency, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 448 (2009).
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and weaknesses in the current federal clemency apparatus.”143 He identifies
three goals that a reform proposal should try to achieve: the new system
“must be sufficiently agile to respond to the public interest,” it has to “make
the system more responsive to those federal offenders deserving of clem-
ency,” and it “must take action to prevent any presidential abuse” of the
clemency power.144
Brian Hoffstadt’s lengthy and detailed piece on “normalizing” clem-
ency contains a valuable list of the constitutional limits on the clemency
power.145 Overall, Hoffstadt concludes “[r]eform is necessary,” and he of-
fers six ways it might be enacted, but he does not seem particularly optimis-
tic about any of their chances for success.146
3. Congress and Clemency
Brian Hoffstadt’s article on “normalizing” clemency also contains a
helpful section analyzing whether Congress might have a type of clemency
power of its own.147 Todd Peterson also writes on this issue of potential
congressional clemency power, asking “what role is left to Congress given
the express grant of pardon authority to the President?”148 He cycles
through a helpful history of clemency, including notable legal cases,149
before arranging the Nixon pardon, Iran-Contra pardons, FALN commuta-
tions, Marc Rich pardon, and others into categories based on why Peterson
believes Congress might have a reason to interfere with the president’s
clemency power.150 The rest of the article is spent examining the various
areas where Congress might try to interfere with the clemency power. These
articles are must-read material on the question of congressional clemency.
Lauren Schorr “propose[s] a way to bring Congress into the exercise of
the pardon power . . . [her] proposed reform: instead of acting according to
regulations promulgated by the executive branch, the Office of the Pardon
Attorney should act in accordance with Congressional legislation.”151 Fol-
lowing a review of the history of clemency and its functions in the separa-
tion of powers system,152 Schorr explains the clemency application
process,153 then delves deeper into the relationship between the president
143. Id. at 455.
144. Id. at 457.
145. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561,
594–95 (2001).
146. Id. at 640.
147. Id. at 610–15.
148. Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Au-
thority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2003).
149. Id. at 1228–35.
150. Id. at 1235–40.
151. Lauren Schorr, Breaking into the Pardon Power: Congress and the Office of the Pardon
Attorney, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (2009).
152. Id. at 1536–42.
153. Id. at 1542–45.
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and Congress over clemency power.154 Under her new regulatory scheme,
the pardon attorney would need to be confirmed by the Senate,155 and the
Office of the Pardon Attorney would be subject to congressional
oversight.156
4. Conditional Clemency
Harold Krent uses the Clinton offer of conditional clemency to mem-
bers of the FALN as a springboard for a helpful primer on conditional par-
dons—that is, where the president requires some sort of action (or non-
action) by the intended recipient of clemency before the pardon takes ef-
fect.157 In a nutshell, Krent argues that “in the conditional pardon context,
courts should not second-guess the wisdom of conditions imposed as long
as the offender consents.”158 “But,” he notes,
judges should vigilantly review two aspects of presidential condi-
tional pardons. First, they should ensure that presidents have not
exercised authority indirectly through the pardon power that oth-
erwise would be prohibited constitutionally, such as favoring one
type of religious observance or lengthening punishment. Second
. . . courts should oversee any presidential finding that an offender
has violated a condition, thereby protecting individuals against ar-
bitrary revocation.159
Krent’s article is “one-stop shopping” for the major issues raised by a con-
ditional pardon.
5. Nuts and Bolts of Clemency Process
In “Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the Presi-
dent’s Duty To Be Merciful,” Margaret Love covers the following topics:
the history of pardoning; controversial pardons; the process for applying for
clemency; the usual use of clemency by past presidents; and the gradual
drop in clemency grants, along with reasons for that drop.160 Especially
notable here for the clemency researcher are two extended sections in which
Love articulates the reasons why she believes the president has a duty to
pardon.161 She concludes by offering “a number of simple ways in which
the President can make his exercise of the pardon power more reliable and
154. Id. at 1545–48.
155. Id. at 1560.
156. Id. at 1561.
157. Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1665 (2001).
158. Id. at 1670.
159. Id.
160. Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the
President’s Duty To Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1485–1500 (2000).
161. Id. at 1500–09.
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respectable, and therefore less politically risky.”162 Those suggestions are:
“1. Shore up the Attorney General’s Advisory Role, 2. Be Generous and
Expect No Credit, 3. Act First, Explain Later, and 4. Make Considered Use
of the Power in Light of Its Public Purposes.”163
In “The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive
Clemency,” former pardon attorney staff member Samuel Morison offers an
in-depth (138-page) philosophical analysis of clemency. This piece is in-
cluded here for Morison’s useful explanation of the administrative goings-
on behind the scenes of the pardon process.164
A piece by Mark Strasser offers helpful sections on two important top-
ics.165 First, Strasser discusses whether a pardon should be considered an
“act of grace” or a decision made for the public welfare—an important
topic, given the conflicting case law on these questions.166 Second, he
delves into the “self-pardon” question mentioned earlier with regard to
pieces by Nida, Spiro, and Kalt, finding that “[c]urrently, it seems that the
President could issue a self-pardon.”167
III. THE 2010S
A. Barack Obama and Drug Sentence Commutations
As noted by the editorial board of the New York Times in February
2014, President Barack Obama had, to date, established “one of the least
merciful administrations in modern history.”168 However, in 2015, he raised
the hopes of clemency advocates with both his statements169 and his
actions.170
B. University of St. Thomas Law Journal (2012)
In 2012, the University of St. Thomas School of Law hosted a sympo-
sium focusing on federal commutations.171 Among the issues covered were:
162. Id. at 1509.
163. Id. at 1509–12.
164. Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive Clem-
ency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 34–43 (2005). For a detailed analysis of clemency in the context of
immigration, see Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 253 (2010).
165. Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the
United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85 (2002).
166. See id. at 100–16.
167. Id. at 153.
168. Editorial Board, Mercy in the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/opinion/mercy-in-the-justice-system.html?_r=0.
169. See Ryan J. Reilly, Obama: I’ll Use Clemency Power ‘More Aggressively’, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/21/obama-clemency-pardon_n_69
11784.html.
170. See Horwitz & Eilperin, supra note 56.
171. See Robert L. Ehrlich, Pardons and Commutations: Observations from the Front Lines, 9
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 669 (2013) (an article from this conference containing valuable first-hand
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(1) the ongoing relevance of the power of the president to commute
sentences; (2) whether it made sense for courts to review clemency grants;
and (3) whether the federal pardon process could be improved by incorpo-
rating a version from one of the states.
1. Relevance of the Power to Commute
In “The President’s Power to Commute: Is It Still Relevant?,” I con-
sidered the relevance of the commutation power in the twenty-first century.
Following a review of the literature on federal commutations,172 I argued
that sentence commutations have been woefully neglected in recent years,
and pointed to several examples of how commutations have served impor-
tant goals throughout American history.173 I concluded by noting how a
commutation can allow someone to receive a clean slate in life, a fact that
will keep the commutation power relevant indefinitely.174
2. Judicial Review of Clemency Decisions
Daniel Kobil’s contribution to this special issue looks at “whether the
courts should be asked to intervene in clemency matters.”175 The piece con-
siders both federal and state clemency court cases and finds that:
Judicial review can properly be used to enforce textual limitations
on the clemency power . . . to limit the ability of executives to
condition grants of clemency on the relinquishment of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights . . . [and sometimes] to review clemency
practices that deprive applicants of equal protection or due pro-
cess of law.176
However, judicial review is not likely to “impel executives to actually use
the power more often.”177
3. State Models for Improving Federal Clemency
In this issue, Margaret Love examines several reform plans drawn
from the states that could be models for a revamped clemency administra-
tive apparatus.178 Among those options are: the “independent board”
insights from a state governor); see also Mark Osler, A Biblical Value in the Constitution: Mercy,
Clemency, Faith and History, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 769 (2012) (providing a fascinating look at
the history of clemency from the perspective of Christianity).
172. Jeffrey Crouch, The President’s Power to Commute: Is It Still Relevant?, 9 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 681, 682–83 (2013).
173. See id. at 685–90.
174. Id. at 697.
175. Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 698, 699 (2012).
176. Id. at 729.
177. Id.
178. Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process: What the President
Can Learn from the States, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 730 (2012).
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model;179 the “shared power” model;180 and the “optional consultation”
model.181 Ultimately, she advises greater “authority,”182 “accountabil-
ity,”183 and “transparency”184 as part of the reform process.
C. Other Publications
A number of other publications have tackled various clemency-related
issues during this half decade, including: two pieces on whether President
Obama should grant clemency to nonviolent drug offenders; a case study of
Bill Clinton’s final pardons; whether we are in the “twilight of the pardon
power”; and what can be done to fix the clemency screening apparatus.
1. Clemency for Drug Offenders
In a 2010 article, Douglas Berman urged President Obama to “Turn[ ]
Hope-and-Change Talk Into Clemency Action for Nonviolent Drug Offend-
ers.”185 Berman argues that “[i]n the one part of the criminal justice system
that is in the President’s exclusive control—the power to grant clemency in
the form of pardons, commutations, and reprieves—President Obama has
so far failed to make good on his campaign themes of ‘hope’ and
‘change.’”186 After a review of the history of clemency—and noting its rise
and present fall187—Berman laments that, after over a year in office,
Obama has “not been moved by—or has lacked the personal interest and
professional courage to try to find—a single case in the massive federal
criminal justice system calling for some kind of clemency relief.”188 Be-
yond a few acts of individual clemency, Berman urges Obama to “seriously
consider creating some form of a ‘Clemency Commission’ headed by a
‘clemency czar.’”189
Mark Osler and Matthew Fass revisit Shanor and Miller’s earlier piece
on “systemic” pardons.190 They suggest that a way to assist drug offenders
who were not helped by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 would be to emu-
late “President Ford’s thorough and broad examination of more than 21,000
people who petitioned for clemency for offenses related to the draft during
179. Id. at 744–45.
180. Id. at 745–47.
181. Id. at 747–51.
182. Id. at 751–52.
183. Id. at 752–53.
184. Love, supra note 178, at 753–54.
185. Douglas A. Berman, Turning Hope-and-Change Talk Into Clemency Action for Nonvio-
lent Drug Offenders, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 59 (2010).
186. Id. at 64.
187. Id. at 65–69.
188. Id. at 71.
189. Id. at 72.
190. See Mark Osler & Matthew Fass, The Ford Approach and Real Fairness for Crack Con-
victs, 23 FED SENT’G REP. 228, 228–32 (2011).
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the Vietnam War.191 They argue that such a program “would systemically
and thoroughly address a national problem with troubling racial implica-
tions . . . [help reestablish] the exercise of the pardon power as a legitimate
part of the President’s job [and finally,] make real the Obama administra-
tion’s commitment to offer something new in the field of criminal law.”192
Similar to Berman, Osler and Fass conclude that “[i]f there is a time and a
place for hope and change, it is now.”193
2. Bill Clinton’s “Parting Pardon Party”
Albert Alschuler takes a close look at Bill Clinton’s “last minute”
clemency decisions, including the Marc Rich pardon, the Carlos Vignali
commutation, and several others, and provides a helpful look at the context
surrounding those decisions.194 Alschuler admits that even his detailed anal-
ysis is only scratching the surface of Clinton’s final acts of clemency, not-
ing that “[t]his article has reviewed fewer than one-quarter of President
Clinton’s last-day grants of clemency.”195 Still, that review is useful, as is a
quick look at the recent history of the men and women who have served as
pardon attorneys.196
3. Have We Reached the Pardon Power’s “Twilight”?
Following an extremely detailed review of clemency’s past use and
administration through 1980,197 Margaret Love notes that “[a]fter 1980,
presidential pardoning went into a decline” and “perhaps the most impor-
tant negative influence on presidential pardoning was the hostility of federal
prosecutors and a change in the administration of the pardon program at the
Justice Department that allowed prosecutors to control clemency recom-
mendations.”198 Reviewing the clemency practices of Clinton and George
W. Bush, Love argues that “it was [Bush’s] own early decision not to ques-
tion or give direction to the Justice Department in pardon matters that led to
what he described as a ‘massive injustice’ in the system, just as President
Clinton’s similar neglect of his power had led to similar chaos and unfair-
ness eight years before.”199 Love urges that “President Obama ought not
191. Id. at 228.
192. Id. at 231.
193. Id.
194. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1131, 1137–63 (2010).
195. Id. at 1163.
196. See id. at 1167.
197. Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 1169, 1172–93 (2010).
198. Id. at 1193–94.
199. Id. at 1203.
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wait to use his power, if only to avoid embarrassment in a final summing
up.”200
Rachel Barkow observes the “fall of the clemency power” and argues
for its “resurrection as a critical mechanism for the President to assert con-
trol over the executive branch in criminal cases.”201 She argues that clem-
ency is “a mechanism for protecting liberty because it allows the President
to correct his or her agents when they reach too far.”202
4. Fixing the Clemency Screening Apparatus
Paul Rosenzweig is disappointed by the current state of clemency, not-
ing that the federal prison population sits around 200,000203 while “Presi-
dent Obama’s twenty-two pardons are but a miniscule fraction” of that
number.204 To “reinvigorate the pardon power and return it to its original
function,” Rosenzweig recommends the following:
Recreate a pardon-reviewing authority either outside of the De-
partment of Justice, as part of the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, or as a direct function of the Attorney General as the
President’s personal representative; and [s]taff the new Pardon
Office with a range of staff, including prosecutors, sociologists,
psychologists, historians, and even defense attorneys.205
Rachel Barkow and Mark Osler argue that the current clemency bu-
reaucratic apparatus requires replacement: “Embedding a single official (the
pardon attorney) deep within the DOJ has proven to be a failure. Instead,
review of clemency petitions should be entrusted to a commission that has a
diverse, standing membership that includes key conservative representa-
tives who are particularly sensitive to victim interests and public-safety
concerns.”206 What is more, the new bureaucracy “should have representa-
tion from the DOJ and take the views of prosecutors seriously, [but] the
commission itself should exist outside the Justice Department and its rec-
ommendations should go directly to the White House.”207
CONCLUSION
Since Mark Rozell’s bibliographic essay was published in 1989, the
clemency power has received a fair amount of attention from legal scholars
200. Id. at 1204.
201. Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 807 (2015).
202. Id. at 869.
203. Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 593 (2012).
204. Id. at 603.
205. Id. at 610.
206. Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clem-
ency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015).
207. Id. at 5–6.
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in traditional venues (e.g., law review articles, comments, and notes). Some
scholars, including Margaret Love,208 Douglas Berman,209 Samuel Mori-
son,210 and others,211 have also established websites and blogs containing
helpful clemency research materials.
In just the last several years, some legal scholars and advocates have
gone beyond the normal calls for reform and taken matters into their own
hands. At the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Mark Osler operates
the first legal clinic in the country focused on helping clemency applicants
with their petitions for commutations.212 More recently, Catholic Univer-
sity’s Columbus School of Law has started to offer a legal clinic course that
allows law students to work on clemency cases,213 and Rachel Barkow and
Mark Osler have established a temporary Clemency Resource Center at
NYU School of Law to work with Clemency Project 2014 and provide free
legal aid to potential applicants for federal clemency.214
Federal clemency may be hard to obtain in 2015, but there is an ever-
growing number of valuable legal resources available to the clemency re-
searcher who knows where—and how—to locate them.
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